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Abstract 
 Economists often emphasize the role of institutions in order to explain 
the difference in wealth and   development among different countries and in 
their researches they mark correlation between institution and economic 
development. This paper tests the validity of these models referring to Albania 
using time-series data from 1993 to 2015. There is evidence of significant 
positive effect of property rights on economic growth and credit to private 
sector, while there is evidenced insignificant impact of contracting institutions 
on economic outputs. A plausible explanation of these differences may be the 
different flexibility towards changes on property right institution rather than 
contracting institutions. 
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Introduction 
 Rule of law, safer property rights, political and economic freedom, 
government accountability, productivity of human capital, advanced 
technology etc. are considered to be drivers of economic growth (Schultz, 
1961) (Barro, 1998) (Mankiw, Romer, & Weil, 1992) (Dougherty & 
Jorgenson, 1996) (Williamson O. , The New Institutional Economics: Taking 
Stock, Looking Ahead , 2000). The role of the institutions, especially, has 
gained consensus among economists and it has given rise to the new historical 
institutional economics as a perspective which extends economics to neglected 
fields of study such as history and culture (Rutherford, 2001).  
 Institutions are described as human constructs that define social, 
political, economic relations in order to create order and reduce uncertainty 
(North, Institutions, 1991). They are constituted by formal institutions such as 
constitutions, laws, property rights and informal institutions e.g. customs, 
doctrines, moral codes, etc. The state's different views, as a complex of formal 
institutions, are distinguished between the contract theory of state and the 
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predatory theory of state (North, Structure and Change in Economic History, 
1981). 
 According to the contract theory of state, enforcement of contracts is 
guaranteed by law enforcement fulfilled by formal institutions - the state - 
which in the public consciousness is delegated and legitimized to exercise this 
function. The academic literature in the field of contract theory focuses on 
identifying the most efficient forms of contract and their enforcement due to 
the failure of one part because of insolvency, information asymmetry, 
incomplete contracts, opportunism etc. (Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 1937), 
(Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 1960), (Williamson O. , The Economic 
Institutions of Capitalism, 1985), (Williamson O. E., 2002). The earliest forms 
of contract enforcement were not fulfilled by the state as a formal institution, 
but were carried out by informal institutions based on a series of informal rules 
and traditions (Greif, Contract enforceability and economic institutions in 
early trade: The Maghribi traders' coalition, 1993), (Greif, Milgrom, & 
Weingast, Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the 
Merchant. Guild, 1994), (Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern 
Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade, 2006). From a historical point of 
view, formal institutions are a continuation, an acknowledgement of a now 
well-established and standardized situation, which merely certifies a set of 
rules already established among the operators.  Critics of the description of 
natural evolution from informal to formal institutions, tend to underline the 
role of the state since the very early stage of economy (Ogilvie & Carus, 2014).  
 According to the predatory theory of state, as far as the state is seen as 
the only authority legitimized to use force to provide peace, order and reduce 
anarchy, it may lead to tyranny. The exclusive right of the state to use force 
risks bringing authoritarianism and expropriation (Hobbes, 1991). From a 
Marxist point of view, the attributes of the state can be exercised by a group 
that transfers wealth from one group to the other, from which the predatory 
theory of state. The risk of expropriation may come as a result of excessive 
state presence in the economy - typical of authoritarian and dictatorial 
countries - which directly or indirectly e.g. through business connected to 
politicians can expropriate the individuals from their property or also from the 
lack of state presence, which exposes individuals to theft and robbery of 
property (Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2003). 
 The importance of protecting the right of private property as a 
determining factor for growth and economic development is emphasized 
earlier by the classical economy (Smith, [1776] 1991) and especially by the 
Austrian school of economy as a necessary tool for satisfaction of his needs 
(Menger, [1871] 1976), stimulating human action (Mises, [1940] 1998) and as 
the most efficient way of transferring information among economic operators 
(Hayek, 1945). Private property protection and political pressure on the 
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government, as a guarantee of the inviolability of private property, both from 
private or public abuse, has an important role in particular for countries in 
transition from communist dictatorships in the market economy (Olson, 2000). 
Private property warranties, legal property titles included in a set of 
constitutional rules that limit arbitrariness and abuse of political power, are 
considered a determining factor of economic development (de Soto, 2000).  
 The purpose of our study is the impact of the Contracting Institutions 
and Property Rights in the economy. I test the role of "contracting theory" and 
"private property rights" in the Albanian economy, within the framework 
developed by (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, Institutions as a fundamental 
cause of long-run growth, 2005), which examines the impact that contracting 
institutions and property rights have in the economy of a country. 
 
Institutions in Albania 
 Until 1990, Albania was part of those Eastern European countries that 
were under a political dictatorship, governed by a single communist party and 
had a central planned economy. The collapse of the totalitarian regime, as the 
last stage of a decline process, caused a fast transition from the centralized 
communist system to a market economy, although at that time the basic 
institutions of the market economy were still missing. The dismantling of the 
old system with the decline of the old formal institutions urged the 
development of new – formal and informal – institutions in the conditions of 
the adoption of liberal democracy and the market economy. The effects of the 
regime collapse were huge, beyond the plain dismantle and substitution of old 
institutions. As Eric Hobsbawn (1996) argues “The formal institutions 
overthrown or founded by a revolution are easily discernible, but they do not 
measure its effects” (p. 182).   
 No other phenomenon has characterized better the transition period 
from communism to liberal democracy than the massive population 
movement. Both immigration and internal migration of the population are a 
social phenomenon with consequences on the form and content of the 
institutions. It is estimated that 1 million Albanians, 1/3 of the population, 
immigrated to western countries (Instat Albania, 2014). Of the same 
magnitude it was the internal migration, synonymous with urbanization.  In 
Albania during the communist regime, there was a ban on leaving the 
countryside, so after the crumble of the communist regime in 1991, a huge 
mass of extremely poor rural people moved toward the cities.  Besides the 
police control over the population movement, there were two other ways by 
which the communist regime curbed the free movement.  
 The first relates to labor rights. In Albania, as in every other country 
with a centralized Marxist planned economy, all enterprises were public and 
employment in any enterprise was a consequence to the authorization of local 
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communist organs, which  at the same time authorized the right of residence 
in their area. Labor mobility was constrained, because political power had 
predominance on management, e.g. Chief personnel were appointed by the 
political office rather than by the management of the enterprise. Consequently, 
the autonomy of management to hire the workers they wanted was limited.  
 The second aspect relates to the fact that private property did not exist; 
with the exception of the house yards, all the property belonged to the state. 
New residential buildings were built by the state based on central planning, 
which restricted free movement. With the collapse of the communist regime 
arose the problem of the legal treatment of the change of property from public 
to private hands. The main problem relates to the fact that, as far as during the 
45 years of communist regime the private property did not exist, the former 
owners who had been seized according to the Soviet model, could not even 
imagine to make a last will and testament of their lost and confiscated 
properties. The lack of testamentary acts raised the problem of accurate 
identification of the former owners' heirs. Issues with return of property to 
former owners, the legal vacuum regarding the status of former agricultural 
cooperatives - whether public or private - without a clear recognized 
ownership, favored the squatter by thousands of families that, taking 
advantage from the abolition of restrictions on free movement, decided to 
leave rural poorer areas. This massive phenomenon of internal migration 
involved the western area of Albania and the peripheries of large cities, whose 
dimensions increased sharply from the influx of people coming from the 
hinterland areas of Albania. The emblems of this swift development are the 
informal areas around the peripheries; between 1991 and 2014 there were 427 
thousand illegal buildings, most of which completely informal (ALUIZNI, 
2015). 
 If informality on one hand has prevented the abusive interventions of 
a public administration among the most corrupt in Europe (Transparency 
International), on the other hand prevents the positive effects of property 
involvement in the legal system (de Soto, 2000). Nevertheless economic 
operators have shown a great deal of vitality, energy and fantasy to face the 
conditions of a market not perfect in the classical sense of the word. The lack 
of formalization of property titles, political instability, the fragility of the rule 
of law, the constant risk of demolition of informal construction by authorities, 
lack of roads, water and electricity networks have not stopped the development 
of the economy. Although a large part of the Albanian economy lies under the 
shadow of informality, which reaches up to 40% of Gross Domestic 
Production (Buehn & Friedrich, 2010), throughout the 1990 to 2016 period 
the economy has experienced continuous growth, poverty reduction and an 
increase in wellbeing (The World Bank). This demonstrates there is a set of 
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informal institution made of rules, traditions, social norms that are created 
spontaneously among the operators, who relate constantly with each other. 
 
Basic specifications 
 In their paper (Acemoglu & Johnson, Unbundling Institutions, 2005), 
represent a linear relationship between economic growth and institution’s 
quality: Yi = α∙Fi + β∙Ii+  Zi∙ δ + εi, where Yi – output of interest, Fi measure 
of contracting institutions, Ii – measure of property rights institutions and Zi 
vector of other variables.  
 In this paper, the outcome of interest are the level of GDP per capita 
as a measure of long-run growth, the domestic credit to the private sector as a 
percentage of GDP and the ratio of investment to GDP.  Stock market 
capitalization is not considered in this work as there is not a stock market in 
Albania.  
 Regarding to the ratio of investment to GDP, in this paper are used 
World Bank indicators – Gross Domestic Investment and Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation. According to Hernando De Soto – “The Mystery of Capital”, 
insecure property rights influence the behavior of investors, so that 
accumulated wealth is not invested in long term capital, but it is held as much 
liquid as possible. Uncertainty and risk of expropriation - weak property rights 
- discourages individuals from capital investments. Conversely, improvements 
in property rights in developing countries discourage individuals from short-
term inventories and encourage capital accumulation and long-term fixed 
capital investments. To test this hypothesis Kerekes & Williamson (Unveiling 
de Soto's Mystery: Property Rights, Capital, and Development, 2008) used as 
output variable the Gross Capital Formation and Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation as a percentage of GDP. GCF besides fixed assets measured by 
GFCF includes also changes in the level of inventories. Breaking down the 
investment ratio to GDP in two indicators allows us to see the impact that 
property rights institutions have on the structure of invested capital. The 
expectation is that an improvement in property rights will have a positive 
impact on the overall investment ratio, and, in particular this impact is 
predicted to be greater in GFC, because trust of individuals towards 
institutions as a guarantor of private property rights grows, which shifts capital 
from short-term liquid assets to long-term fixed assets. 
 In the original model of Acemoglu & Johnson, Polity IV Index and the 
Heritage Property Index are used as proxy for property to measure the property 
rights protection, because they are considered constrains on executive. The 
Political Risk Service Assessment is not considered, as it did not measure 
almost any change over the years in Albania. The World Bank "Enforcing 
Contracts" and "Resolving Insolvency" indexes are used as proxy for 
contracting institution.  
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 In the original model among control variables, there are included 
government consumptions as a percentage of GDP, inflation, geography, legal 
origin, ethno linguistic fractionalization. Since that in this paper Albania is the 
only country, government consumptions and inflation are the only control 
variables. Instrumental variables "the average life expectancy of the first 
colonies" used as the property development level matrix in the two-stage-least-
square model of Acemoglu & Johnson model doesn’t apply in this paper. 
 
Data Analysis 
 In order to run the tests, a time-series dataset for Albania is 
constructed, based on World Bank's annual and averaged data for the period 
1993 – 2017. 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
LnGDPperca~P 23 8.621 .5412132 7.681 9.328 
Domesticcr~r 22 1.924 15.471 3.179 39.460 
Grosscapit~P 23 2.951 7.981 13.2 40.472 
Grossfixed~n 23 2.894 7.923 13.2 40.472 
PolityIV 23 7.173 1.898 5 9 
HPIoverall~e 22 59.65 5.215 49.7 66.9 
EnforcingC~F 14 58.110 2.555 53.66 60.52 
ResolvingI~F 14 33.379 20.517 19.79 64.98 
Government~t 23 10.966 1.280 9.195 14.128 
LnInflation 23 1.319 1.044 -.4148224 37.394 
 
Table 2 Property Rights Institutions 
 
Log GDP per 
capita PPP 
current $ 
Domestic credit to  
private sector 
(% GDP) 
Gross Capital  
Formation 
(% of GDP) 
Gross Fixed 
Capital 
Formation 
 (% of GDP) 
  1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Polity IV 
.22*** 
(.02) 
 7.62*** 
(1.03) 
 1.19 
(.90) 
 .84 
(.94) 
 
Heritage Property  
.082*** 
(.004) 
 2.90*** 
(.24) 
 .05 
(.34) 
 -.088 
(.35) 
Governm. 
Consumption 
(% of GDP) 
-.05 
(.02) 
.01 
(.02) 
.20 
(1.41) 
1.87 
(1.26) 
-
1.89* 
(1.09) 
-1.05 
(1.76) 
-1.91 
(1.14) 
-1.20 
(1.7) 
Log Inflation 
-.10** 
(.04) 
-.09 
(.02) 
.64 
(2.02) 
.64 
(1.42) 
-2.33 
(1.69) 
-2.94 
(1.98) 
-2.48 
(1.76) 
-3.17  
(2.02) 
R-square 0.92 0.96 0.81 0.91 0.46 0.16 0.40 0.14 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance level: ∗∗∗ at 1%, ∗∗ at 5%, ∗ at 10% 
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 Table 2 shows OLS regression between the property rights proxy index 
and respectively log GDP per capita, credit to the private sector and ratio 
investment to GDP.  
 Regarding property rights institution, both the Polity IV and the 
Heritage Property Index show that there is a positive and significant 
relationship between the strengthening of property law institutions and two 
outcomes, economic growth and credit to private sector. In assessing the 
marginal effect for Polity IV or Heritage Property, it should be considered the 
different range of the indicator; Polity IV takes values ranging from -10 to 
+10, while HPI from 0 to 100.  
 Relationship of property rights with GDP growth per capita is 
significant and positive, but modest; an increase of 4 units in the Polity IV 
Index, or the HP Index equivalent of 16 units, has an impact of +1% in the 
GDP per capita.  
 Regarding domestic credit the relation with the property rights index 
is positive, significant and of great economic magnitude. A unit increase in the 
in the Polity IV Index, or the HP Index equivalent of 4 units, has an impact of 
+8% in the domestic credit to private sector. 
 There is no evidence to support the expectations that an increase in the 
protection of private property rights would lead to an increase in the ratio of 
investment to GDP. None of the interested variables shows any correlation 
with the property rights index. 
Table 3 Contracting Institutions 
 
Log GDP per 
capita PPP 
(current $) 
Domestic credit 
to private sector 
(% GDP) 
Gross Capital 
Formation (% 
of GDP) 
Gross Fixed 
Capital 
Formation  (% 
of GDP) 
  1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Enforcing Contracts 
-.056 
(.045) 
 -1.15 
(2.30) 
 1.34* 
(.68) 
 1.37 
(.85) 
 
Resolving Insolvency  
.008 
(.004) 
 .24 
(.25) 
 -.17** 
(.07) 
  -.19* 
(.08) 
Governm. 
Consumption 
(% of GDP) 
.055 
(.19) 
.034 
(.17) 
1.77 
(9.69) 
1.76 
(9.11) 
-4.39 
(2.89) 
-3.81 
(2.59) 
-4.96 
(3.60) 
-4.47 
(3.17) 
Log Inflation 
-.014  
(.24) 
.012 
(.22) 
-1.52 
(12.50) 
1.24 
(11.4) 
.86 
(3.73) 
.72 
(3.25) 
.27 
4.64 
-.42 
(3.97) 
R-square 0.27 0.35 0.07 0.14 0.57 0.63 0.46 0.56 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance level: ∗∗∗ at 1%, ∗∗ at 5%, ∗ at 10% 
 
 Table 3 shows OLS regression between the contracting institution 
proxy indexes and respectively log GDP per capita, credit to the private sector 
and ratio investment to GDP.  
 Regarding contracting institutions (EC and RI), they do not look to 
have an impact on economic growth and expansion of credit.  
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 Regarding the ratio of investment to GDP, there is evidence of strong 
positive relationship of Enforcing Contracts with Gross Capital Formation. An 
increase of one unit in the quality of EC Index has an impact of +1.3% in the 
gross invested capital. 
 Contrary to our expectations, EC does not seem to have a relationship 
with gross fixed capital formation; an increase in invested capital is not 
reflected in fixed long-term assets.  
 Resolving insolvency and investing capital do not result in having a 
relationship between them. 
 
Conclusion 
 The analysis on GDP per capita, credit to private sector and investment 
ratio to GDP in Albania for the period from 1993 to 2015 shows similar results 
with those of other works in this field of study.  
 Property rights measured by PI and Polity IV as indicators of 
constrains on executive, have a significant positive effect on two major 
economic outcomes, the GDP per capita and credit to private sector. No effect 
of property rights on the ratio investment to GDP is found, although further 
analyses confirm a positive effect on foreign direct investment (Table 4 and 
Table 5).  
 The evidence of positive relationship between property rights and 
economic growth may lead to discussions on how this influence is explicated. 
An important consideration to be taken into account is that safe property rights 
are symptomatic of the rule of law and so, they are part of a broader context. 
The indexes used are indicative of the protection of property rights, but they 
also measure the level of democracy, business protection, legitimacy of 
institutions etc. Each of them plays a positive role in economic development, 
so it is quite evident the mutual influence between institutions and economy. 
Better institutions lead to economic growth, but a wealthier society demands 
responsibility and accountability from its institutions.  
 In this paper it is noted that contracting institutions have a limited 
impact (enforcing contracts on gross capital formation) or no impact on the 
economic outcomes considered. A possible explanation is that individuals 
have different instruments to reduce the risks of loss following failure to 
comply with the contractual terms by the counterparty. The creditor may apply 
a higher interest rate to a riskier debtor or hold a mortgage as a security for 
debt. Operators may decide to change the terms of the contract by extending 
the repayment term or transforming the debt into invested capital i.e. 
transforming the creditor into a shareholder. In Albania, investors in the 
construction sector in financial difficulties may compensate the suppliers by 
offering them apartments they have built; a trader may transfer to the creditor 
part of goods he has bought. The possible solutions to the adverse conditions 
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of contracting institutions are far wider than the possible solutions in case of 
deterioration of property rights institutions. 
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Appendix 
Table 1.a: Variable Definitions and Sources 
Variable Abbreviation Definition 
Gross Domestic 
Product per capita 
GDP per 
capita 
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear 
population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all 
resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and 
minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. 
It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of 
fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural 
resources. Data are in current U.S. dollars. 
Source: World Bank 
Domestic credit to 
private sector 
 Domestic credit to private sector refers to financial resources 
provided to the private sector by financial corporations, such 
as through loans, purchases of no equity securities, and trade 
credits and other accounts receivable that establish a claim for 
repayment. For some countries these claims include credit to 
public enterprises. The financial corporations include 
monetary authorities and deposit money banks, as well as 
other financial corporations where data are available 
(including corporations that do not accept transferable 
deposits but do incur such liabilities as time and savings 
deposits). Examples of other financial corporations are 
finance and leasing companies, money lenders, insurance 
corporations, pension funds, and foreign exchange 
companies. 
Gross Capital 
Formation 
GCF Gross capital formation (formerly gross domestic investment) 
consists of outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the 
economy plus net changes in the level of inventories. Fixed 
assets include land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and 
so on); plant, machinery, and equipment purchases; and the 
construction of roads, railways, and the like, including 
schools , offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and 
commercial and industrial buildings. Inventories are stocks of 
goods held by firms to meet temporary or unexpected 
fluctuations in production or sales, and "work in progress." 
According to the 1993 SNA, net acquisitions of valuables are 
also considered capital formation. 
Gross Fixed 
Capital Formation 
GFCF Gross fixed capital formation (formerly gross domestic fixed 
investment) includes land improvements (fences, ditches, 
drains, and so on); plant, machinery, and equipment 
purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and the 
like, including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential 
dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings. 
According to the 1993 SNA, net acquisitions of valuables are 
also considered capital formation. 
Enforcing 
Contracts  
EC The enforcing contracts indicator measures the time and cost 
for resolving a commercial dispute through a local first-
instance court, and the quality of judicial processes index, 
evaluating whether each economy has adopted a series of 
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good practices that promote quality and efficiency in the 
court system.  
Resolving 
Insolvency 
RI Doing Business studies the time, cost and outcome of 
insolvency proceedings involving domestic legal entities. 
These variables are used to calculate the recovery rate, which 
is recorded as cents on the dollar recovered by secured 
creditors through reorganization, liquidation or debt 
enforcement (foreclosure or receivership) proceedings. 
Source: World Bank 
Polity IV Index Polity IV The Polity scheme consists of six component measures that 
record key qualities of executive recruitment, constraints on 
executive authority and political competition in different 
countries. It also records changes in the institutionalized 
qualities of governing authority. 
Source: Center for Systemic Peace and Societal-Systems 
Research Inc. 
Heritage Property 
Index 
HPI The principles of economic freedom are measured in the 
Index of Economic Freedom, a guide published annually. The 
Index covers 12 quantitative and qualitative factors grouped 
in four categories such as rule of law, government size, 
regulatory efficiency, open markets. 
Source: The Heritage Foundation 
Government 
Consumption 
 General government final consumption expenditure (formerly 
general government consumption) includes all government 
current expenditures for purchases of goods and services 
(including compensation of employees). It also includes most 
expenditure on national defence and security, but excludes 
government military expenditures that are part of government 
capital formation. 
Source: World Bank 
Inflation  Source: Bank of Albania  
 
Table 4 
FDI Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
PolityIV 1.316.015 .3043634 4.32 0.000 .6789753 1.953.055 
Governmentcons .2540267 .3669475 0.69 0.497 -.5140033 1.022.057 
LnInflation .2143313 .5681455 0.38 0.710 -.9748109 1.403.474 
_cons -7.145.402 4.730.444 -1.51 0.147 -1.704.634 2.755.531 
 
Table 5 
FDI Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
HPIoverallscore .5641862 .0769654 7.33 0.000 .4018034 .7265691 
Governmentcons .5392149 .3900198 1.38 0.185 -.2836548 1.362.085 
LnInflation .3519539 .4408339 0.80 0.436 -.5781243 1.282.032 
_cons -3.412.564 6.730.517 -5.07 0.000 -48.32579 -19.92549 
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Table 6: Econometric Tests   
 
Independent Variable HPI   
Skewness/Kurtosis tests for 
Normality 
    
Breusch-
Pagan / 
Cook-
Weisberg  
test for 
heteroskedast
icity  
Variable      
Ob
s 
Pr(Skewn
ess) 
Pr(Kurto
sis) 
adj 
chi2(2) 
Prob>c
hi2 
  Prob > chi2 
GDP per capita current $ 21 0.3380 0.1523 3.36 0.1864  0.7094 
Domestic credit to private sector 
(% of GDP) 
21 0.6945 0.1952 2.04 0.3603  0.8752 
Gross Capital Formation (% of 
GDP) 
21 0.6875 0.1452 2.56 0.2774  0.2489 
Gross Fixed Capital Format. (% 
of GDP) 
21 0.8667 0.1246 2.69 0.2612  0.1526 
Foreigndirectinvestmentnet 21 0.1378 0.9195 2.48 0.2890    0.7790 
        
Independent Variable Enforcing 
Contracts 
  
Skewness/Kurtosis tests for 
Normality 
    
Breusch-
Pagan / 
Cook-
Weisberg  
test for 
heteroskedast
icity  
Variable      
Ob
s 
Pr(Skewn
ess) 
Pr(Kurto
sis) 
adj 
chi2(2) 
Prob>c
hi2 
  Prob > chi2 
GDP per capita current $ 13 0.1695 0.8401 2.24 0.3255  0.3378 
Domestic credit to private sector 
(% of GDP) 
13 0.1318 0.7629 2.78 0.2488  0.3585 
Gross Capital Formation (% of 
GDP) 
13 0.9947 0.6273 0.24 0.8888  0.7517 
Gross Fixed Capital Format. (% 
of GDP) 
13 0.8562 0.2935 1.28 0.5285  0.8629 
Foreigndirectinvestmentnet 13 0.5531 0.6029 0.66 0.7180   0.5982 
        
Independent Variable Resolving 
Insolvency 
  
Skewness/Kurtosis tests for 
Normality 
    
Breusch-
Pagan / 
Cook-
Weisberg  
test for 
heteroskedast
icity  
Variable      
Ob
s 
Pr(Skewn
ess) 
Pr(Kurto
sis) 
adj 
chi2(2) 
Prob>c
hi2 
  Prob > chi2 
GDP per capita current $ 13 0.2938 0.8346 1.29 0.5255  0.2097 
Domestic credit to private sector 
(% of GDP) 
13 0.2026 0.7461 2.00 0.3682  0.2160 
Gross Capital Formation (% of 
GDP) 
13 0.4287 0.5274 1.14 0.5651  0.5010 
Gross Fixed Capital Format. (% 
of GDP) 
13 0.6646 0.8336 0.23 0.8904  0.4627 
Foreigndirectinvestmentnet 13 0.5531 0.6029 0.66 0.7180   0.5982 
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Table 7 Econometric Tests: Multicollinearity   
  PolityIV Govern~t Infl~n    HPIove~e Govern~t Infl~n 
PolityIV 1.0000     HPIoverall~e 1.0000    
Government~t -0.1822 1.0000    Government~t 0.0283 1.0000   
LnInflation -0.6273 0.2883 1.0000   LnInflation -0.5066 0.2883 1.0000 
         
  Enforc~F Govern~t Infl~n    Resolv~F Govern~t Infl~n 
EnforcingC~F 1.0000     ResolvingI~F 1.0000    
Government~t -0.0142 1.0000    Government~t 0.0906 1.0000   
LnInflation 0.6772 0.2883 1.0000   LnInflation -0.6561 0.2883 1.0000  
 
  
